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ESSAY
IMPEACHING THE PRESIDENTt
CASS R. SUNSTEINtt
INTRODUCTION
The American Constitution allows the removal of the President for
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."' Well over
200 years after ratification, the meaning of these terms is debated, even over
the most fundamental questions. The continuing debate raises a number of
important issues in constitutional theory-involving the role of "politics" in
" This Essay represents a witten and updated version of the Owen J. Roberts Memorial
Lecture, delivered at the University of Pennsylvania on November 10, 1998.
t" Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. The author is grateful to Akhil Amar,
Bruce Ackerman, and Susan Bloch for helpful discussion, to Jack Goldsmith, Richard Posner,
and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments on a previous draft, and to Brian Lehman and
Margaret Peterlin for excellent research assistance. Professor Sunstein testified before the
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives on November 9,
1998, and this Essay overlaps to some extent with that testimony. See Testimony Before the
United States House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion (Nov. 9, 1998) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein), available in LEXIS, Federal News Serv-
ice.
I U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
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interpretation, the place of text and history, the relevance of changed cir-
cumstances, the place of post-ratification practice, and the relevance of
contemporary moral and political changes to constitutional meaning.
This is, then, a valuable arena in which to test contending approaches to
constitutional law. But the interpretive debate has practical importance
too--perhaps growing practical importance. After a fifty year period in
which no judges were impeached-from 1936 to 1986-three federal
judges were impeached between 1986 and 1989.2 The 1998 impeachment
of President Clinton may signal more frequent resort to the impeachment
mechanism, especially in a world in which recent events are highly salient,
and in which political opponents like to play "tit for tat." At least it can be
said that, in an era in which scandals involving public or private behavior
are an omnipresent aspect of news coverage and partisan politics, the coun-
try may well start to resort to impeachment more frequently. Is this desir-
able? How, if at all, does this possibility bear on constitutional interpreta-
tion?
I offer two substantive claims here. The simplest is that, with respect to
the President, the principal goal of the Impeachment Clause is to allow im-
peachment for a narrow category of egregious or large-scale abuses of
authority that comes from the exercise of distinctly presidential powers. On
this view, a criminal violation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condi-
tion for impeaching the President. What is generally necessary is an egre-
gious abuse of power that the President has by virtue of being President.
Outside of this category of cases, impeachment is generally foreign to our
traditions and is prohibited by the Constitution. Outside of this category of
cases, the appropriate course of action for any crime is generally3 not im-
peachment, but a prosecutorial judgment, after the President leaves office,
whether indictment is desirable. This is not a claim that the President can
never be impeached for decisions and acts that do not involve the abuse of
distinctly presidential powers. The Nation has left that issue undecided, and
it should continue to do so until it becomes necessary to decide it.
2 These were Harry Claibome, impeached for income tax evasion; Alcee Hastings, im-
peached for taking a bribe; and Walter Nixon, impeached for perjuring himself before a grand
jury by denying he made a phone call to a state prosecutor to ask him to drop a case. The
Senate convicted all three. See STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, HOUSE CoMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 105TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT: MODERN PRECEDENTS 4-14 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter 105TH CONG.
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY] (discussing these three judicial impeachments of the 1980s); see
also STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG.,
2D SESS., CONsTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 43-55 (Comm.
Print 1974) [hereinafter 93D CONG. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY] (listing previous impeachments
of ajfresident, a cabinet officer, a senator, and 10 federal judges).
I offer an explanation of this qualification infra at note 110 and accompanying text.
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My second substantive claim is that in the current period, it is more, not
less, important to insist on this particular understanding of the Impeachment
Clause. There are grave systemic dangers in resorting to impeachment ex-
cept in the most extreme cases. The prospect of impeachment can be highly
destabilizing to government, and in an era in which the opposing party and
the mass media are likely to be aligned in accusing political opponents of
criminality or severe misconduct, there is a continuing risk that impeach-
ment proceedings will become decreasingly exceptional. This risk is all the
more serious in light of the central modem role of the American President
both domestically and internationally. In the interest of national stability,
the best course lies in legislative forbearance and self-restraint-a kind of
"mutual arms control" agreement, to be entered into by both political par-
ties, in the service of the Nation as a whole.
I also offer two claims about constitutional interpretation. The first is
that our tradition is, at least in part, a common law tradition,4 and the Na-
tion's practice between ratification and the present is no less important for
interpretive purposes than the Nation's understanding in 1787 and 1788.
Indeed, that long-standing practice may be the most important clue to the
appropriate meaning of the phrase "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
And with respect to the President, the Nation has shown a remarkable tradi-
tion of forbearance and restraint, by refusing to proceed in cases in which
Presidents-including Presidents Reagan, Bush, Nixon,5  Kennedy,
Eisenhower, Roosevelt, and Lincoln-might have been said, by some, to
have committed impeachable offenses.6 With respect to the office of the
President, there have been only three serious impeachment inquiries in
Americanhistory. 7 This practice of caution is as important as anything else
to my general argument.
A striking aspect of the debate over impeachment between 1997 and
1999 has been its insistently originalist character. Many participants, on all
sides, have urged that the meaning of the Impeachment Clause depends on
the understanding of the Nation in 1787. Part of my argument speaks in
originalist terms, and originalism does support my general conclusion. But
post-ratification practice speaks even more unambiguously, and it is that
practice that deserves to bear most of the argument's weight. Political
4 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Cal. L. REV.
877, 884-88 (1996) (arguing that, in the American legal tradition, the Constitution is "part of
an evolutionary common law system").
5 I mean to refer here to the allegation, against President Nixon, of income tax evasion.
6 For a discussion of these possible impeachable offenses, see infra Part II.B.
7 Two of these inquiries involved alleged abuses of public power. One of them was a
grotesquely partisan affair that history has not treated well; I believe that the impeachment of
President Clinton will be regarded in the same basic way.
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"precedents" are less articulate than judicial ones, but in this context, our
political practice speaks very loudly indeed.
It should be clear that one of my principal targets is the famous 1970
statement by Gerald Ford, then a Representative from Michigan, that an im-
peachable offense "is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers [it] to be."8 In a practical sense, of course, Ford was right-in the
absence of extraordinary circumstance, no court is likely to review a deci-
sion to impeach. But in a constitutional sense, he was entirely wrong. The
Constitution sharply circumscribes the power of the House of Representa-
tives by limiting the category of legitimately impeachable offenses.
This Essay has three basic parts. Part I discusses the original under-
standing of Congress's impeachment power, with reference to the Constitu-
tion's text and the founding era. Part II explores historical practice. Part III
briefly applies the basic analysis to the effort to impeach President Clinton;
much more importantly, it deals with modem political culture and its rela-
tionship to the topic of impeachment.
I. 1788
Some people believe that the meaning of the Constitution is settled by
the original understanding,9 and debates about impeachment have had a
striking and unmistakable "originalist" dimension. I have suggested that
post-ratification practice is highly relevant, but of course the original under-
standing matters too. Let us begin, then, by examining the original under-
standing of the impeachment power. What was the impeachment power
soon after ratification in, for example, 1788?
A. The Text
The text of the Constitution is the place to begin. It says that a Presi-
dent may be removed for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors." 10 How much progress can be made by looking at the text
alone, 11 at least if we attempt to read it as it would have been read in 1788?
The basic answer is that while the text certainly does not answer every
8 116 CONG. REc. 11, 913 (1970) (statement of Rep. Gerald Ford).
9 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 38 (1997) (arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted after consulting the writ-
ings of delegates to the Constitutional Convention and other intelligent people of that era and
determining "the original meaning of the text").
10 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
11 Of course no text can ever be read "alone"; it is always read in light of context, in-
eluding cultural understandings.
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question, it is highly suggestive. What it suggests is that to be impeachable,
the President must have engaged in large-scale abuses of distinctly presi-
dential powers.
The opening reference to treason and bribery, together with the word
"other," seems to indicate that high crimes and misdemeanors should be un-
derstood to be of the same general kind and magnitude as treason and brib-
ery (as in the Latin canon of construction, ejusdem generisZ). For a reader
in 1788, the terms "treason" and "bribery" would be unmistakable refer-
ences to misuse of office, probably through betraying the country in one
way or another.' 3 Thus, it would be reasonable to think that "other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" must amount to a kind of egregious misuse of
public office.14 The Constitution does not say "Murder, Assault, and other
High Crimes and Misdemeanors," nor does it say, "Blasphemy, Disorderly
Conduct, and other High Crimes and Misdemeanors."' 5 The opening refer-
ences to treason and bribery seem to limit the kinds of offenses for which a
president may be removed from office.
Other provisions of the Constitution appear to support this judgment;
they suggest that the choice of terms was no coincidence, that the words
"treason" and "bribery" were carefully chosen, and that the term "high" was
intended as a serious restriction on the legitimate grounds for impeachment.
The Interstate Extradition Clause refers to persons "charged in any State
With Treason, Felony, or other Crime,"'16 in striking contrast to the im-
peachment provision. Consider, also, the Speech and Debate Clause, which
refers to congressional immunity from arrest "in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony, and Breach of the Peace," 17 and the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury
Clause, which guarantees a right to a grand jury when someone is "held to
12 The phrase "ejusdem generis" means "of the same kind."
13 See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the founding of the Constitution.
14 By itself, the term "high" creates a problem of "scaling without a modulus," a problem
that is bound to create arbitrariness and variability in individual judgments. See Cass R. Sun-
stein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107
YALE L.J. 2071, 2106-07 (1998) (explaining that a "modulus" is a particular rating to a stan-
dard stimulus used "to assign ratings to other stimuli in relation to that modulus"). Much of
the debate is about the search for a modulus. The terms "treason" and "bribery" might supply
one; so too with the historical practice, as I emphasize. I am grateful to Akhil Amar for this
analogy.
See Letter from Jed Rubenfeld, Professor of Law, Yale University, et al. to Newt
Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives 1-2 (Nov. 4, 1998) (on file with Professor
Rubenfeld) (arguing that the words "treason" and "bribery" indicate that impeachment is the
appropriate remedy for only abuses of executive power).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime."18 The different consti-
tutional references to diverse "crimes" suggests that the impeachment provi-
sion had a special purpose. Because the phrase "other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" is a dramatic contrast to other provisions in the text, it is
reasonable to think that those terms are a reference to abuses that are, in
both nature and magnitude, similar to treason and bribery.
This reading does not entirely dispose of the interpretive problems. For
one thing, the term "bribery" creates some ambiguity. Bribery could be the
President's acceptance of a payment of money to act in a way that is incon-
sistent with the republic's needs or desires, or it could be a payment of
money by the President himself, to convince people to vote for him. These
would be abuses of power. But "bribery" could also be a payment by the
President to a judge, to decide a case in favor of a childhood friend; or it
could be a presidential payment of money to an athlete, to allow an oppos-
ing team to win some competition. In light of the wide range of possible
"bribes," it would be possible to suggest that not every "bribe" is an abuse
of office, or even connected in any way with office. And if this is so, it is
not altogether clear what counts as "other" high crimes and misdemeanors.
There is another textual puzzle. The word "high" precedes "crimes" but
not "misdemeanors"; does this suggest that any misdemeanor is a legitimate
basis for impeachment? Perhaps a "high crime" or a "misdemeanor" is suf-
ficient for impeachment. And is there not a difference between "crimes"
and "misdemeanors," as the text seems to suggest? Perhaps-the open-
minded contemporary textualist might wonder, trying to reconstruct the
audience's judgment in 1788-misdemeanors are not crimes at all, but
forms of relatively minor misconduct. It would thus be possible to think
that the Constitution allows impeachment for the following: treason; brib-
ery; other high crimes, of whatever sort; and misdemeanors, or crimes of a
lower variety. Perhaps, then, treason and bribery are obviously impeachable
offenses, but the text grants posterity a great deal of leeway to remove
presidents for crimes or misbehavior that fall short of those things. At the
very least, the text might seem to leave this possibility open.
For someone in 1788, however, this would be a most unlikely judg-
ment, and the apparent textual puzzles would be likely to dissolve fairly
rapidly. If the Constitution has given Congress the authority to remove the
President for the stated offenses ("Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors"), it would be extremely odd, textually speaking, to say
that the Constitution has given Congress the authority to remove the Presi-
dent for any criminal offenses at all. It would be far more sensible, textually
18 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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speaking, to understand "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" to conform
to "treason" and "bribery," and to require the relevant "misdemeanors" to
have to meet a certain threshold of "highness" as well. Thus, the phrase
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" would be read as a piece, to suggest ille-
gal acts of a serious kind and magnitude and also acts that, whether or not
technically illegal, amount to an egregious abuse of office. 19 This is not an
inevitable reading, but it seems to be the more natural one.
Nor-in all probability-would the term "bribery" create serious puz-
zles. A reader in 1788 would likely read the word "bribery," in context, to
mean taking or offering money in return for abuse of official office; the
term would not likely be taken as a reference to private acts of bribery.20
The text thus supports the view that impeachment is designed for abuses of
public authority. But it does not answer every question, and armed with the
text alone, reasonable people could understand similar cases in quite differ-
ent ways. It is certainly appropriate to look elsewhere.
B. The Founding
The founding of the Constitution of course occurred in two stages. The
first involved the Constitution's actual drafting, which was done in secret;
the second involved ratification, which was highly public. There is thus
room for a debate over the appropriate sources of constitutional interpreta-
tion. It is possible to question whether the secret meetings of the drafters
should play a large role in constitutional interpretation; but what happened
there is extremely interesting. Impeachment was no marginal issue. It was
central to the Framers' deliberations. What emerged from those delibera-
tions was an effort to cabin the impeachment power in order to preserve the
separation of powers, and also to define the grounds for impeachment in a
way that would meet the Framers' stated concern: the large-scale abuse of
distinctly presidential powers.
1. The Convention
Meeting in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, the Framers sought to
produce a form of government that would reject England's monarchical
19 There is historical support for this understanding. See RAOUL BERGER,
IMPEAcHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 59-67 (1973) (discussing the origins of
the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" in English law and concluding that the meaning
of the phrase is "confined to impeachments, without roots in the ordinary criminal law").
20 Thus, I do not believe that all briberies are impeachable offenses; a president who paid
an athlete to lose a basketball game would not have committed an act of "bribery" within the
meaning of the Impeachment Clause.
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heritage in favor of a system of republican self-government.2 1 The Framers
agreed that a president was necessary to head the new nation and they
shared a commitment to disciplining public officials through a system of
checks and balances. 22 But they sharply disagreed about the precise extent
of presidential power and about how, if at all, the President should be re-
movable from office. This question played a large role in the Constitutional
Convention, as revealed by James Madison's detailed notes of the founding
debate, which I summarize here. The extensive debates in the Convention
strongly suggest a sharply limited conception of impeachment, one that sees
the process as a targeted response to the President's abuse of public power
through manipulation of distinctly presidential authority, or through pro-
23curement of his office by corrupt means.
The initial draft of the Constitution took the form of resolutions pre-
sented before the members meeting in Philadelphia on June 13, 1787.24 One
of the key resolutions, found in the Convention's official journal, said that
the President could be impeached for "mal-practice, or neglect of duty."
25
On July 20, this provision provoked an extended debate. Three positions
dominated the day's discussion. One extreme view, represented by Roger
Sherman and attracting very little support, was that the legislature should
have the power to remove the Executive at its pleasure. Charles Pinckney,
Rufus King, and Gouverneur Morris represented the opposing extreme
view, that in the new republic, the President "ought not to be impeachable
whilst in office. 26  This view did receive considerable support, and it
played a large role in the day's debate. It was defended partly by reference
to the system of separation of powers, which would be compromised by im-
peachment, and partly by reference to the fact that the President, unlike a
monarch, would be subject to periodic elections, a point that seemed to
make impeachment less necessary. The third position, which ultimately car-
ried the day, was that the President should be impeachable, but only for a
narrow category of abuses of the public trust-for example, by procuring
office by unlawful means, or using distinctly presidential authority for ends
that are treasonous.
21 A good treatment of this issue is JOSEPH M. BESsETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON:
DELIBERATIvE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994).
22 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (discussing checks and bal-
ances with regard to the relative powers of the legislative and executive branches).
23 See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 61-
70 (1966) (discussing the need for a check on the executive branch to discourage abuse of
presidential powers).
24 See I id. at 223-39.
25 1 id. at 226.
26 2 id. at 64.
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George Mason took a lead role in promoting the compromise course.
Against Pinckney, he argued that it was necessary to counter the risk that
the President might obtain his office by corrupting his electors. "[S]hall that
man be above" justice, he asked, "who can commit the most extensive in-
justice? '27 This question identified the risk, to which the Convention was
quite sensitive, that the President might turn into a near-monarch; and it led
the crucial votes-above all, Morris-to agree that impeachment might be
permitted for, in Morris's words, "corruption & some few other offences."
28
James Madison promptly concurred with Morris, pointing to a case in which
a president "might betray his trust to foreign powers." 29 Capturing the
emerging consensus of the Convention, Edmund Randolph favored im-
peachment on the ground that the Executive "will have great opportunit[ie]s
of abusing his power; particularly in time of war when the military force,
and in some respects the public money will be in his hands." 30 The clear
trend of the discussion was toward allowing a narrow impeachment power
by which the President could be removed only for gross abuses of public
authority.
But Pinckney, concerned about the separation of powers, continued to
insist that a power of impeachment would eliminate the President's "inde-
pendence." 31 Morris once again offered the decisive response, urging that
he was convinced of the necessity of impeachment, because the President
"may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would
say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Mag-
istrate in foreign pay without being able to guard [against] it by displacing
him." At the same time, Morris insisted, "we should take care to provide
some mode that will not make him dependent on the Legislature."33 Led by
Morris, the convention thus moved toward a compromise position, one that
would continue the separation between the President and Congress, but still
permit the President to be removed in the most extreme cases. The discus-
sion ended without agreement on any particular set of terms.
The new draft of the Constitution's Impeachment Clause emerged two
weeks later, on August 6. It would have permitted the President to be im-
peached, but only for treason, bribery, and corruption (apparently exempli-
27 2 id. at 65.
28 2 id.
29 2 id. at 66.
30 2 id. at 67.
31 2 id. at 66.
32 2 id. at 68.
33 2 id. at 69.
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fled by the President's securing his office by unlawful means). 34 With little
additional debate, and for no clear reason, this provision was narrowed on
September 4, to "treason, or bribery." 35 But in early September, the dele-
gates took up the Impeachment Clause anew. Here they slightly broadened
the grounds for removing the President, but in a way that stayed close to the
compromise position that appeared to carry the day in July.
The opening argument was offered by Mason, who complained that the
provision was too narrow to capture his earlier concerns, and that "malad-
ministration" should be added, so as to include "[a]ttempts to subvert the
Constitution" that would not count as treason or bribery.36 Mason's strong-
est point was that the President should be removable if he attempted to undo
the constitutional plan. But Madison insisted that the term "maladministra-
tion" was "[s]o vague" that it would "be equivalent to a tenure during pleas-
ure of the Senate," 37 which the Framers had been attempting to avoid all
along. Hence Mason withdrew "maladministration" and added the new,
more precise terms "other high crimes and misdemeanors [against] the
State. 3 8 The term "high Crimes & Misdemeanors" was borrowed from
English law, as we shall see; but it received no independent debate in the
Convention. During the debates, the only subsequent development-and it
is not trivial-was that "against the State" was changed to "against the
United States" in order to remove ambiguity.
39
There is one further wrinkle. The resulting draft was submitted to the
Committee on Arrangement and Style, which deleted the words "against the
United States." 0 Hence there is an interpretive puzzle. Was the deletion
designed to broaden the legitimate grounds for impeachment? This is ex-
tremely unlikely. As its name suggests, the Committee on Style and Ar-
rangement lacked substantive authority (which is not to deny that it made
some substantive changes), and it is far more likely that the particular
change was made on grounds of redundancy. Hence the Impeachment
Clause, in its final incarnation, was targeted at "high Crimes and Misde-
meanors."
The most reasonable reading of these debates is that in designing the
provision governing impeachment, the Framers were thinking, exclusively
34 See 2 id. at 185-86 ("[The President] shall be removed from his office on impeachment
by the House of Representatives, and conviction in the supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or
corution.").
2 id. at 499.
36 2 id. at 550.
37 2 id.
38 2 id.
39 2 id. at 551.
40 See 2 id. at 600.
[147:279
IMPEACHING THE PRESIDENT
or principally, of large-scale abuses of distinctly public authority. The
unanimous rejection of "maladministration" suggests that the Framers
sought to create an authority that was both confined and well-defined. All
of the alleged grounds for impeachment involved abuses of public trust
through the exercise of distinctly presidential powers (or corruption in pro-
curing those powers). There were no references to private crimes, such as
murder and assault. We cannot over-read silence on that point; it is possible
that the Framers would have considered some such crimes to be "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." But the debates strongly suggest that the
model for impeachment was the large-scale abuse of public office.
2. Ratification
The same view is supported by discussion at the time of ratification and
in the early period. The basic point is that impeachment was explained and
defended as a way of removing the President when he used his public
authority for treasonous or corrupt purposes. I offer a few brief notations
here.
Alexander Hamilton explained that the "subjects" of impeachment in-
volve "the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they
relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to society itself."' This sugges-
tion should be taken as an echo of the textual idea, on which the discussants
were unanimous on September 8, that the relevant high crimes and misde-
meanors must run "against the United States.
'A2
One of the most sustained discussions came from the highly respected
(and later Supreme Court Justice) James Iredell, speaking in the North
Carolina ratifying convention: "I suppose the only instances, in which the
President would be liable to impeachment, would be where he had received
a bribe, or had acted from some corrupt motive or other.'A3 By way of ex-
planation, Iredell referred to a situation in which "the President had received
a bribe. . . from a foreign power, and, under the influence of that bribe, had
address enough with the Senate, by artifices and misrepresentations, to se-
duce their consent to a pernicious treaty.
' 4
James Wilson wrote similarly in his great 1791 Lectures on Law: "In
the United States and in Pennsylvania, impeachments are confined to politi-
41 THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 334 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beldoffed., 2d ed. 1987).
42 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 545.
43 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 165 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
442 id.
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cal characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political pun-
ishments. '" 5 Another early commentator went so far as to say that
[t]he legitimate causes of impeachment... can have reference only to public
character, and official duty.... In general, those offences, which may be
committed equally by a private person, as a public officer, are not the subjects
of impeachment. Murder, burglary, robbery, and indeed all offenses not im-
mediately connected with office,... are left to the ordinary course of judicial
46proceeding....
This was a contested view, and a few people suggested in the early period
that murder and the like would be a legitimate basis for impeachment; but
there was general agreement that the great office of impeachment was to
remove from office those who had abused distinctly public power. In the
ratification debates themselves, I have not been able to find a single exam-
ple of an impeachable offense that did not involve this kind of abuse, and
certainly the prominent examples all involved abuses of that sort.
3. High Crimes and Misdemeanors in England
Thus far, I have said very little about the particular understanding in
America in 1788 of the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." This term
was not debated in the convention; it was treated as a term of art, satisfac-
tory for the purpose. Because the term comes from English law, it is possi-
ble to contend that it should be interpreted in accordance with English un-
derstandings.47
There is considerable sense in this view-the term certainly does come
from English law-but serious questions might be raised about this basic
proposition. The most important point is that it is not at all clear that the
American understanding was the same as the English one. Recall that in the
framing period, participants were aware of two exceedingly important dif-
ferences between America and England: (1) the election of the President
and (2) the separation of powers. As we have seen, these differences led
many to suggest no impeachment power, or at least a narrow power of im-
peachment. It is possible that many of the Framers were aware of the con-
tent of English practice, but it is doubtful that most of them were, or they
knew of every detail. It is even more doubtful that they meant to transport it
45 2 id. at 166.
46 2 id. at 179.
47 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 19, at 54 ("To understand what the Framers had in mind
[regarding the phrase 'high Crimes and Misdemeanors'] we must begin with English law, for
nowhere did they more evidently take off from that law than in drafting impeachment provi-
sions.").
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unreformed into their new republic.48 Thus it is hazardous to suggest, as
some have, that the American understanding essentially incorporates the
English understanding.49 Especially because the impeachment device had
fallen into disuse in England during the century preceding the American
founding, there can be little support for the view that the Founders sought to
introduce the English practice of, say, 1360 to 1600. With these qualifica-
tions, let me briefly investigate the English practice. As it turns out, that
practice basically supports the argument I am making here.
The English idea of "impeachment" arose largely because its objects
were, for various reasons, not subject to the reach of conventional criminal
law. Hence, ministers and functionaries of the King were subject to im-
peachment for public offenses. Under English law, the term "misdemeanor"
was emphatically not a reference to what we would now call misdemeanor
(as opposed to felony); it referred instead to distinctly public misconduct.
Thus the term "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" represented "a category of
political crimes against the state."
50
In English law, there was some ambiguity in the use of the word "high."
Did the term refer to the seriousness of the offense, or to the nature of the
office against which the proceeding was aimed? Probably the better view,
based on the actual practice, was that the term referred to both.51 In any
case a "high Crime and Misdemeanor" could be a serious crime, but it could
also be a serious offense that was not a technical violation of the criminal
law. Serious misconduct, as in the form of committing the Nation to "'an
ignominious treaty,"' was said by some to be a just basis for impeachment
in England.52 Whatever one thinks of the particular example, it is clear that
there was no consensus in England that a "high Crime and Misdemeanor"
had to be a violation of the criminal law. Indeed, the better view-based on
what was said at the framing-is that an impeachable offense, to qualify as
such, need not be a crime in the United States.
48 See PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-
1805, at 266-68 (1984) (arguing that the Framers were acquainted with English practice, but
did not possess "intimate knowledge" of its details).
49 See id. at 266-68. Hoffer and Hull examine numerous state practices, revealing that
impeachment was relatively common in the colonies and the states. See id. at 78-95. This
practice does not, however, show that impeachment of the President was intended to be rela-
tively common, and I do not understand Hoffer and Hull to have so argued.
50 BERGER, supra note 19, at 61.
5 See id. at 59-60 ("Impeachment itself was conceived because the objects of impeach-
ment, for one reason or another, were beyond the reach of ordinary criminal redress.").
52 See id. at 63 (quoting 2 RICHARD WOODDESON, LAWS OF ENGLAND 602-03 (E. Lynch
ed., 1792)).
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For present purposes, the more important point is that the great cases
involving charges of impeachable conduct in England reveal a far readier
resort to the practice than has been the case in America, probably for the
reasons mentioned above. But those cases generally involved criminal or
extremely inappropriate conduct in the form of abuse of the authority
granted by public office, or, in other terms, the kind of misconduct that
someone could engage in only by virtue of holding public office. A promi-
nent listing of the key cases refers to the following: unlawful use of pub-
licly appropriated funds;53 thwarting Parliament's order to store arms and
ammunition in storehouses; 54 preventing a political enemy from standing for
election and causing his unlawful arrest and detention;55 arbitrarily granting
general blank search warrants; 56 and stopping writs of appeal. 57 In addition,
a general list suggests that in the great run of cases, impeachment proceed-
ings were brought for the abuse of the distinctive authority vested in public
officers.58  It appears that the actual English practice was more wide-
ranging,59 with some exceptions to the basic point I have been urging; but
the most highly publicized and well-known cases fell within the category of
the egregious use, or misuse, of official powers.
We may summarize the discussion with two simple points. First, Eng-
lish practice shows a far readier resort to impeachment than the American
practice. This difference makes sense in light of the fact that the President
is subject to electoral checks and the American commitment to separation of
powers. The place of impeachment in a monarchy is naturally different
from the place of impeachment in a republic. Second, English practice was
concentrated, at least as a general rule, on the abusive exercise of distinctly
public authorities.
4. The Originalist's Impeachment Clause
I do not believe that the meaning of the Impeachment Clause was set-
tled in 1787, any more than that the meaning of the First Amendment was
settled in 1789. Two centuries of practice matter a great deal, especially,
perhaps, in the context of separation of powers. But the original under-
53 See BERGER, supra note 19, at 67.
54 See id. at 68.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 67.
58 See BERGER, supra note 19, at 69-71 (reducing a list of charges into "intelligible cate-
gories," all involving the abuse of authority by public officers).
See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 48, at 64-67 (explaining that the American practice
substantially narrowed prior practice by limiting impeachment to official misconduct).
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standing is certainly a part of the interpretive picture. The best judgment is
that the Impeachment Clause was fundamentally designed for egregious or
large-scale abuses of power that officials exercised by virtue of their office.
In 1788, it would have been implausible to contend that a president could be
impeached for the commission of any crime at all, or that a violation of his
oath of office, through a failure to obey the laws, would be by itself suffi-
cient for impeachment. Indeed, in 1788 it would have been close to implau-
sible to suggest that a criminal act was necessary for impeachment; a large-
scale abuse of office could have provided a good basis for impeachment
even if no crime was involved.
To be sure, there is no explicit suggestion that the President could not
be impeached for misconduct that did not involve an abuse of office. In the
framing of ratification debates, I have been unable to find any discussion of
murder, rape, or assault, as grounds for impeachment. Although silence on
this point is not decisive, it is highly revealing. Whether or not it resolves
some barely imaginable cases, it suggests that the key cases, from which
any analysis must start, involve close analogies to treason and bribery.
60
II. Two CENTURIES OF PRACTICE
What have been our historical practices? This question is important for
several reasons. Some people argue that America does and should have a
60 My colleague Joseph Isenbergh has argued that the House has the power to impeach
the President for acts short of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," and also that it is legitimate
for the Senate to convict but not to remove the President in the face of a House impeachment;
in his view, impeachment is mandatory for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," but permissive
for acts that do not meet that standard. See Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential
Immunity from Judicial Process (Dec. 31, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, available at
<http:/www.law.uchicago.edulPublications/Occasional>). This is a creative and ingenious
argument. I cannot discuss it in detail here, but for three reasons, I do not believe that it
should be accepted. The first problem is the sheer weight of history. For well over a century
at least, the nation has agreed that without a high crime and misdemeanor, there can be no
impeachment, and any effort to disrupt that agreement bears a heavy burden of justification.
The second problem is practical: recognition of congressional power to impeach the President
(or for that matter judges) for reasons that do not involve high crimes and misdemeanors
would gravely threaten the separation of powers. The third problem is that despite its ingen-
ious presentation, I do not believe that Isenbergh has shown that this view had the support of
the founding era. Most of his evidence is speculative, inferential, and indirect, and the direct
evidence supports the conventional view. Consider, for example, the crucial remark by
George Mason, arguing, in his initial claim to include "maladministration," that "it is the more
necessary to extend: the power of impeachments." 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 550 (em-
phasis added). This remark, and the following colloquy, would be senseless if Congress al-
ready had the power to impeach presidents for grounds falling short of high crimes and mis-
demeanors. Certainly someone, during the founding and ratification debates, would have
been expected to make the mandatory/permissive distinction if it had been what was intended
and understood.
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common law constitution-a constitutional order in which the meaning of
constitutional provisions is settled less by the original understanding than by
the practices and judgments that have been developed over time.61 It is
controversial to claim that this is the way things should be, but it is un-
doubtedly part of the way things are. In the context of impeachment, any
kind of common law constitution will reflect legislative rather than judicial
practices. There are of course no judicial precedents with respect to what
counts as an impeachable offense; but there is nonetheless a long line of
historical practices, capturing a distinctive set of social judgments. We can
build, from these practices, a set of understandings about constitutional
meaning. Those understandings greatly fortify the basic proposition I am
attempting to defend here.
A. Impeachments and the President: Two (But Now Three) Cases
The most important lesson of history is that the exceptional infrequency
of serious impeachment proceedings against the President--even in circum-
stances in which such proceedings might have appeared legitimate-sug-
gests a historical understanding that impeachment is appropriate only in the
most extraordinary cases of abuse of distinctly presidential authority. We
should notice at the outset that, before the impeachment of President
Clinton, there had only been sixteen impeachments; only one President was
impeached; and only one other President was subject to serious impeach-
ment inquiry.
President Nixon was of course subject to an impeachment inquiry be-
cause of a series of alleged abuses of the public trust. Thus, Article 1 of the
Articles of Impeachment against President Nixon referred to an unlawful
entry into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee "for the
purpose of securing political intelligence" and a conspiracy to cover it up.
62
Article 2 referred to the allegation that he "repeatedly engaged in conduct
violating the constitutional rights of citizens," including the use of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secret
63
Service. Article 3 referred to repeated refusals to produce papers and
things under subpoenas specifically signed "to resolve by direct evidence
fundamental, factual questions relating to Presidential direction, knowledge
or approval of actions demonstrated by other evidence to be substantial
61 See Strauss, supra note 4, at 877-80 (summarizing the "common law approach to con-
stitutional interpretation").
62 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 2 (1974).
63 Id. at 3.
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grounds for impeachment of the President."64 In retrospect, a remarkable
feature of these Articles is their relative restraint-fastening on large-scale
abuses of distinctly public authority. In exercise of that relative restraint,
the House of Representatives declined to proceed against President Nixon
with an allegation of unlawful tax evasion.
65
The only President to have been impeached (though not convicted) was
the unelected President Andrew Johnson, who was subject to an extraordi-
narily partisan battle. The key counts involved allegations that he dis-
charged his Secretary of State in violation of the Tenure in Office Act,
which Johnson believed (rightly, as it turned out) to be unconstitutional.66
President Johnson was impeached less because of a violation of law-
though there was a violation of law-than because radical Republicans were
critical of Johnson on unambiguously political grounds. 67 History has not
been kind to that impeachment effort, which weakened the presidency for a
period of decades. 68 But even in the Johnson case, when partisan fervor was
at its height, the allegations involved the allegedly large-scale abuse of presi-
dential authority, through the lawless exercise of presidential power. With
respect to the office of the President, at least, impeachment has been consid-
ered as a weapon of rare and last resort, in a way that vindicates the Fram-
ers' emphasis on the safeguards of the electoral process.
64 Id. at 4.
65 See The U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary Hearing on the Im-
peachment of the President, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter House Impeachment Hearing,
105th Cong.], available in 1998 WL 846820 (statements of former Congresswoman Elizabeth
Holtzman (D-NY), former Congressman Robert Drinan (D-MA), former Congressman Wayne
Owens (D-UT)) (noting that because it was personal rather than official misconduct, Nixon's
tax evasion was not impeachable).
66 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that the Tenure in Office Act
of 1867 was unconstitutional because it prohibited the President from removing executive of-
6; See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HIsToRic IMPEAcHMENTs OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 245 (1992) (noting that a sena-
tor from Massachusetts viewed the impeachment issue as based on Johnson's obstruction of
Republican policies and not on his violation of the Tenure in Office Act).
68 See id. at 260 (noting that Henry Cabot Lodge believed that the executive branch was
crippled and the balance of power was unduly shifted to Congress as a result of the Johnson
impeachment).
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B. Dogs That Didn't Bark6 9
To have a sense of American history, it is at least as important to have a
sense of the cases in which impeachment did not occur as of cases in which
it did occur. This topic has received far too little emphasis during discus-
sion of the impeachment question. An examination of American history
shows that even when impeachment might well have been contemplated,
cooler heads prevailed, and both the Nation and Congress insisted on an ex-
tremely high standard. Consider here simply a few cases (they could easily
be multiplied), mostly from twentieth-century history; in all of these the
House acted with great restraint. The House was correct to do so, both as a
matter of constitutional law and as a matter of prudence. I list the cases not
to complain about the Nation's failure to pursue the impeachment route, but,
on the contrary, to suggest the solidity of the American presumption against
impeachment.
1. Nixon's Taxes
In a decision that has received considerable publicity in the last weeks,
the House refused to include, as an impeachment count, legitimate allega-
tions of income tax evasion against President Nixon. A basic ground for the
refusal was that income tax evasion-though hardly excusable and indeed a
major breach of every citizen's obligation-did not amount to a misuse of
distinctly presidential authority.
70
2. Reagan and the Iran-Contra Controversy
President Reagan was allegedly involved in unlawful misconduct in
connection with the Iran-Contra controversy; at least he presided over an
administration allegedly involved in such unlawful misconduct. Indeed, the
Independent Counsel's investigation yielded no fewer than seven guilty
pleas and four convictions, including convictions of relatively high-level
executive branch officials.
Many people believed or feared that President Reagan was personally
involved in the unlawful acts. This allegation could have been sufficient to
69 See ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in 1 SHERLOCK HOLMEs: THE COMPLETE
NOvELs AND SToRIES 455, 475 (1986) ("Before deciding that question I had grasped the sig-
nificance of the silence of the dog, for one true inference invariably suggests others .... Ob-
viously the midnight visitor was someone whom the dog knew well.").
70 See House Impeachment Hearing, 105th Cong., supra note 65 (statements of former
Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY), former Congressman Robert Drinan (D-MA),
former Congressman Wayne Owens (D-UT)) (noting that because it was personal rather than
official misconduct, Nixon's tax evasion was not impeachable).
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commence impeachment hearings to investigate those charges. Nonethe-S71
less, impeachment was never considered as a serious option.
3. Bush and the Iran-Contra Controversy
Many people have alleged that Vice-President Bush was involved in as-
pects of the Iran-Contra controversy, and some people suggested that he had
personal knowledge of the unlawful activity. An impeachment investigation
would not have been hard to imagine. Here too impeachment never
emerged as a serious possibility.
4. Roosevelt and Illicit Arms Shipments
In World War II, the Lend-Lease Act allowed the President to build and
sell arms and ammunition to other nations, most notably England. Before
the passage of the Act, the sale of arms to other nations, including England,
was prohibited by law. Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that President
Roosevelt was secretly and unlawfully transferring arms-including over
20,000 airplanes, rifles, and ammunition-to England. Indeed, illegal ap-
proval of such weapons transfers were quite routine in the two full months
before Congress authorized it. Even President Roosevelt's Secretary of War
"felt troubled by the illegality and deception." 72 It is often said that Roose-
velt both deceived and lied to Congress and the American people in con-
nection with the program.
5. Eisenhower's Public Lies
President Eisenhower lied to the country at least twice. After the Rus-
sian downing of a U-2 airplane, he publicly denied that the plane was en-
gaged in intelligence-gathering, claiming that it "may have drifted across
the Russian border," and that it was a weather plane. The story had to be
retracted after the Soviets produced contrary evidence from the plane.73 In
71 This point was highlighted during a hearing of the Constitution Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee, when Professor Arthur Schlesinger commented, "[lit seems to
me that the Reagan administration systematically violated the Boland Amendments in the
course of aid to the contras in Nicaragua." Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, responded, "If I may answer, professor, I was on the Iran-contra
committee, and we went all summer turning over every rock we could. Nobody ever filed a
bill of impeachment against the president." History and Background of Impeachment and the
U.S. Constitution, Federal News Service, Nov. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Transcripts File.
72 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, A Divorce Waiting to Happen: Franklin Roosevelt and the
Law ofNeutrality, 1935-1941, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 413, 486 (1996-97).
See D. WISE & R Ross, TBE U-2 AFFAIR 57 (1960).
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addition, President Eisenhower shipped arms to a hostile foreign govern-
ment-Indonesia--in return for the release of a hostage; the administration
deceived the Senate and Nation about its activities, and probably violated
domestic law as well. 4
6. Suspicions of Ford's Pardon of Nixon
There were widespread claims of a secret "deal" between President
Ford and President Nixon, culminating in the pardon granted by President
Ford.75 At the time, many Americans suspected that such a "deal" had oc-
curred. So far as I am aware, no evidence supports any such suspicion. But
in view of the climate of the time, these claims might well have produced an
impeachment inquiry.
7. Kennedy's Illicit Relationships
It was widely believed that President Kennedy was involved in a series
of illicit sexual relationships while in office, including an illicit sexual rela-
tionship with a woman who was simultaneously involved with a member of
the Mafia.76 This relationship-some people have suggested-could have
compromised the efforts of the Department of Justice. Some people have
alleged that whether or not it involved technical violations of law, this
reckless behavior reflected a serious indifference to law enforcement efforts.
Yet no one has suggested, at the time or since, that impeachment was the
appropriate course.
8. Lincoln's Suspension of Habeas Corpus
Consider, as just one further illustration, the fact that President Lincoln
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, a serious violation of civil liberties that
was ruled unlawful.77
74 See Peter Morgan, Legal Theory: The Undefined Crime of Lying to Congress, 86 N.W.
U. L. REv. 177, 183 (1992).
75 See Major Points from Appearance by Haig Before Senate Committee, N.Y. TIMEs,
January 10, 1981, atA9.
76 See, e.g., Dangerous World: The Kennedy Years (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 4,
1997) (reporting that Judith Campbell met Kennedy through Frank Sinatra, became his lover,
and "was involved in Kennedy's secret dealings with the Mafia"). It is important to note that
rumors of the affair did not surface until after Kennedy's assassination. However, there is
some evidence that the FBI was aware of the affair. See Caryn James, Ladies' Man Theory:
A Kennedy Tour Stop, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1997, at B7 (mentioning an FBI memo with
Campbell as the subject and an FBI surveillance photo of her).
See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866) (stating that constitutional guarantees
are to be upheld and protected by the courts "at all times, and under all circumstances," ire-
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9. Conclusions
These are simply a few random examples, and doubtless reasonable
people will suggest that some or all of them involve conduct far less egre-
gious, or less legitimately impeachable, than alleged in other actual or hy-
pothetical cases, or with respect to President Clinton. Other reasonable
people will disagree; and if these examples seem weak, it should not be hard
to come up with others. My basic point is to establish a lengthy historical
practice of great restraint. The fact that only one President has been im-
peached, when many others might have been, attests to the strength and lon-
gevity of our historical understandings.
To be sure, it is not entirely clear how to read this history. A particular
problem is that the practices are generally unaccompanied by reasons; we
do not have an authoritative explanation of why impeachment was not taken
seriously in these cases. A rejoinder to my suggestion would be that the
cases of restraint and inaction reveal a practice of cautious exercise of
prosecutorial discretion (and sometimes national ignorance of the miscon-
duct). They do not establish a practice of considering wrongdoing that does
not involve abuse of office, or wrongdoing that is not exceptionally egre-
gious, to be a basis for impeachment. For various reasons, the Nation has
not sought the impeachment route in many cases in which it might have
done so. But this kind of forbearance is not relevant to constitutional inter-
pretation. It does not suggest that the Nation was without power to under-
take impeachment proceedings in these cases. The Nation might have been
responding to political will, or to a lack of public concern about the par-
ticular wrongdoing at issue, or to competing considerations not bearing on
the constitutional questions.
This is not an implausible understanding of the relevant history. Cer-
tainly there was not, in most of the cases, a considered or explicit judgment
against impeachment. Certainly there is a difference between a failure to
exercise prosecutorial discretion and a judgment that a certain offense is not
impeachable as a matter of law. But it is also entirely reasonable to under-
stand the history as reflecting a national judgment that the impeachment de-
vice ought not to be used except in the most extreme cases, and to say as
well that this judgment reflects a certain set of beliefs about what offenses
are legitimately impeachable. 78 It would be very odd to begin to understand
spective of whether the nation is in peace or at war). For the factual details and background of
Milligan, the first significant civil liberties decision by the Supreme Court, see William
Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927
(1997).
78 Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127-30 (1958) (reflecting a judgment that long-
standing practice, under an apparently general statute, narrows the statute's reach).
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the Constitution in a way that would call for impeachment in current and
future cases that are, in principle, comparable to those described above. The
most reasonable inference is that the Nation has decided that impeachment
is not a legitimate solution except in the most egregious cases of presidential
wrongdoing.79
C. Is the Office of the President Unique for Impeachment Purposes?
The Constitution allows impeachment of all civil officers-not only the
President, but also the Vice President, cabinet heads, and judges-for high
crimes and misdemeanors.80 Does this mean that the same standard applies
to all such officers? Are there differences between the legitimate grounds
for impeaching a president and the legitimate grounds for impeaching a fed-
eral judge? The question is extremely important for current purposes. If the
same standards apply, it would make sense to say that the standards-per-
haps the more lenient standards-applied to the impeachment of federal
judges apply as well to the impeachment of presidents. My basic conclu-
sion is that our history establishes that, as applied, the constitutional stan-
dard for impeaching the President has been distinctive, and properly so. 8
1. Non-Presidential Impeachments
By far the largest majority of impeachments in American history have
involved federal judges. Even here, the number is extremely low. In all of
American history, there have been just thirteen judicial impeachments. 2
This is an exceptionally small number of impeachments, as remarkable in its
way as the corresponding number of presidents, especially when we con-
sider the enormously larger number of judges than presidents. Of those
cases, by far the largest number, indeed almost all, involved at least some
79 There is a great deal of difference between the argument I am proposing and a reason-
able alternative: that the power to impeach is somewhat broader than what I have suggested,
but that the House appropriately uses that power only in the most compelling cases. Some
people might suggest, for example, that the House had the power to impeach President
Clinton, but that it did not, all things considered, exercise its discretion wisely. On this view,
the examples I have given show the wise exercise of discretion. I prefer an understanding
involving power to an understanding involving the appropriate exercise of discretion because
it seems to me to fit somewhat better with history, both in the framing period and throughout
history, and because it greatly decreases the likelihood, to which the Founders were alert, that
impeachment will be used as a political tool.
80 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
Sl I avoid the word "higher" because it is somewhat misleading.
82 See 105TH CONG. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, supra note 2, at 4-14 (discussing the three
federal judges who were impeached in the 1980s); 93D CONG. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, supra
note 2, at 28-37 (listing 10 impeachments of federal judges between 1787 and 1974).
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allegation of abuse of distinctly judicial powers. It is possible to argue that
three, and conceivably more, of those cases also involved egregious private
behavior. But this interpretation is itself questionable, and I will suggest
that the most extreme cases involving impeachment of federal judges should
not be understood to set a precedent for impeachment of presidents, a point
to which I will return. Let us now explore the non-presidential impeach-
ments.
One U.S. Senator has been impeached. In 1797, William Blount was
accused of conspiring with the British to incite Native American forces
83against the Spanish and was separately expelled from the Senate. Justice
Samuel Chase was impeached in 1804 for engaging in arbitrary and oppres-
sive treatment of parties before the Court.84 William Belknap, the Secretary
of War, was impeached in 1876 for bribery. In 1912, a judge on the U.S.
Commerce Court, Robert Archbald, was impeached for influence peddling
86with litigants. The bulk of impeached officials have been federal district
court judges. Consider the following catalogue:
John Pickering was impeached in 1803 for refusing to hear witnesses in
a case, for violating an act of Congress, and also for drunkenness and blas-
phemy;
87
James H. Peck was impeached in 1826 for holding a lawyer in contempt
of court for no legitimate reason;
88
West H. Humphreys was impeached in 1862 for supporting secession
and acting as a confederate judge;8 9
Mark Delahay was impeached in 1876 for questionable financial deal-
ings and drunkenness; 90
Charles Swayne was impeached in 1903 for not residing in his district
and unlawfully holding attorneys in contempt of court;
91
George W. English was impeached in 1926 for disbarring lawyers and
for threatening members of the press and jurors;92
83 See 93D CONG. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, supra note 2, at 29-30.
84 For a general discussion, see REHNQUIST, supra note 67, at 59 (discussing the charges
against Chase based on his conduct during the Fries trial in which he "conducted himself in a
manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust").
85 See 93D CONG. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, supra note 2, at 34-35.
86 See id.
87 See id. at 32.
88 See id. at 34.
89 See id. at 33.
90 See id. at 32.
91 See id. at 34-35.
92 See id. at 33-34.
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Harold Louderback was impeached in 1932 for setting up a false resi-
dence in anticipation of a divorce action by his wife;
93
Halsted Ritter was impeached in 1936 for income tax evasion and cor-
ruption in a receivership case;
94
Harry Claiborne was impeached in 1986 for income tax evasion and for
perjury in connection with that unlawful act;
95
Alcee Hastings was impeached in 1989 for taking a bribe;96 and
Walter L. Nixon, Jr. was impeached in 1989 for perjury before a grand
jury, in connection with a claim that he had called a prosecutor to obtain fa-
vorable treatment for the son of a friend.97
Of the fifteen non-presidential impeachments, only seven were con-
victed: Pickering, Humphreys, Archbald, Ritter, Claiborne, Hastings, and
Nixon. Delahay, Belknap, and English resigned before the Senate vote.
2. Of Judges and Presidents
In several impeachments, it would be possible to argue that the grounds
invoked by the House of Representatives could not meet the test I have sug-
gested for presidential impeachment. Harry Claiborne, for example, was
not shown to have abused distinctly judicial powers, and it is possible to
make the same argument about Walter Nixon, Jr. and Harold Louderback.
Some of the counts for impeaching Mark Delahay and Charles Swayne also
seem to fall short of my suggested standard. Do these practices suggest that
the test I have suggested is wrong? If, as the text plainly suggests, the same
standard governs both the President and the federal judiciary, the answer is
that my test is indeed wrong.
We can distinguish three possible positions here. First, it might be
thought that the legitimate grounds for impeachment are the same for all of-
ficers. On this view, there is no difference among civil officers. Second, it
might be thought that to impeach the President, Congress must meet an es-
pecially distinctive or high standard-what counts as a high crime or mis-
demeanor is context-specific. This view could be described as a suggestion
that the same constitutional standard must be applied differently to different
officers. An impeachable act for a judge might not be an impeachable act
for a vice president. Third, it might be thought that the constitutional stan-
dard is the same, but that the House legitimately exercises prosecutorial dis-
93 See id. at 35, 60.
94 See id.
95 See 105TH CONG. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, supra note 2, at 21-23.
96 See id. at 25-27.
97 See id. at 23-25.
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cretion so as to match offense to office. On this view, for example, perjury
may be a clear basis for impeaching a judge (who is charged with operating
the system of justice), but not for impeaching the President. For constitu-
tional purposes, we might collapse the first and third positions, since it
seems plain that the House, in its exercise of prosecutorial discretion, might
legitimately choose not to proceed against someone who has committed
technically impeachable offenses,98 and that the nature of the office is rele-
vant to the exercise of discretion.
At first glance, the constitutional text seems to support the view that the
constitutional standards are identical. As noted, the text is the same. But
there are several problems with this apparently simple position. The first is
based on the history recited above. The Framers' particular concerns in-
volved protection of the President from the discretionary authority of Con-
gress; they sought to insulate the President in particular from a high degree
of dependence. They expressed no such concern about judges. It is cer-
tainly legitimate to suggest that interpretation should be affected by the
Framers' and ratifiers' special concern with excessive use of the impeach-
ment device with respect to the President.
A second, more structural point involves the great difficulty of remov-
ing federal judges, who of course have life tenure. Judicial independence is,
of course, important, but the fact that judges have life tenure might well be
thought to justify a more expansive impeachment power. If judges can be
impeached only for the most grotesque abuses, then the Nation will be stuck
with judges whose abuse falls just short of that level for the remainder of
those judges' lives. This practical concern argues in favor of a lower stan-
dard for impeaching judges, or at least for a different application of the
standard. Indeed, this practical concern might reasonably be labeled a
structural one, firmly rooted in the Constitution itself. The Constitution's
structure-life tenure for judges and four year terms for presidents-
strongly argues in favor of a narrower impeachment power for the President.
A third and more textual argument is that judges have tenure "during
good behavior," a provision that does not, of course, apply to the President.
The President may not be removed for "bad behavior." It might be sug-
gested that with respect to judges, the "good behavior" provision qualifies,
or works hand in hand with, the Impeachment Clause. It does so by allow-
ing impeachment of judges on somewhat broader grounds-bad behavior-
and not simply high crimes and misdemeanors, or perhaps high crimes and
misdemeanors understood in the context of judges to include bad behavior.
98 But see generally Isenbergh, supra note 60.
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I do not believe that this argument is convincing. Judges may not be
removed from office for bad behavior; they may be removed only for high
crimes and misdemeanors. The function of the "good behavior" clause is
not to give Congress broader power to remove judges from office; it is sim-
ply to make clear that judges ordinarily have life tenure. There is no
authority in Congress to remove judges who have not engaged in "good be-
havior."
On the other hand-and this is the fourth and to me the most important
point-judges have particular duties, and it may be that what counts as a
"high Crime and Misdemeanor" is understood by reference to those duties.
A judge who committed perjury might well be disqualified from the par-
ticular office of judge; the same need not be true of the Vice President. On
this view, the power of impeachment is understood by the distinct functions
of the officer.
Finally, historical practice suggests a broader congressional power to
impeach judges than presidents, and indeed, it suggests a special congres-
sional reluctance to proceed against the President. We might say that our
history has unambiguously converged on the judgment that there is a lower
threshold for judges than for presidents. The theory is partly that judges
cannot otherwise be removed from office. It is partly that it is uniquely de-
stabilizing if presidents are too freely subject to removal from office. To
remove a federal judge is an important act, but by itself it does not paralyze
the Nation, or place in some doubt the continued stability of domestic and
international policy. Presidential impeachment proceedings in this sense
have no clear parallel. The existence of a wide range of political checks on
presidential misconduct has apparently been thought to provide a kind of
surrogate safeguard, one that makes impeachment a remedy of rarest re-
sort.
9 9
III. APPLICATIONS: PRESIDENT CLINTON, MUTUAL
ARMS CONTROL, AND BEYOND
My basic purpose thus far has been to defend a particular understanding
of the impeachment power. But two elements are missing from the picture.
The first, of more immediate interest, has to do with the evaluation of the
1998 impeachment of President Clinton. Did President Clinton commit a
99 The cases in which judges have been impeached for perjury might be understood as
suggesting that a judge, whose basic job is to preside over trials, cannot be entrusted with that
job in the face of a perjury conviction. Presidential perjury is not excusable, but it is a differ-
ent sort of problem. It should also be noted that Harry Claibome was impeached partly be-
cause he was in jail at the time, and that Walter Nixon, Jr.'s perjury involved a call to a prose-
cutor.
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high crime and misdemeanor? This is a time-bound question, of course; and
to answer, it will be necessary to spend a little time on an extremely un-
pleasant and sordid set of events. The second question, of far more general
interest, has to do with future uses of the impeachment power, and how the
House of Representatives and the Nation should now understand that de-
vice.
I suggest that the impeachment of President Clinton was unconstitu-
tional, because the two articles of impeachment identified no legitimate
ground for impeaching the President. Much more importantly, I suggest
that it is essential for members of opposing political views to enter into a
kind of "mutual arms control agreement," in which they self-consciously
decide to use the impeachment weapon only in the most extreme cases, in a
small but far from trivial effort to reduce the level of scandal-mongering and
accusation that has undermined American democracy for the last several
decades.
100
A. The Peculiar Case ofPresident Clinton
Both the original understanding and-historical practice converge on a
simple principle: The principal purpose of the impeachment provision is to
allow the House of Representatives to impeach the President of the United
States for egregious misconduct that amounts to the abusive misuse of the
authority of his office. This principle does not exclude the possibility that a
president would be impeachable for an extremely heinous "private" crime,
such as murder or rape. But it suggests that outside of such extraordinary
(and unprecedented) cases, impeachment is unacceptable.
1. A Simple Conclusion
How does all this bear on the current allegations against President
Clinton? The first implication is that the charges made by Judge Kenneth
Starr and David Schippers did not, even if proven, constitute legitimately
impeachable offenses under the Constitution. The second implication is that
no impeachable offense was identified in the four Articles of Impeachment
voted on by the House of Representatives, including the two Articles that
were approved. These charges do not involve egregious misuse of the pow-
ers of the office of the President. Perjury and obstruction of justice-the
basis of the two Articles that passed the House-are extremely serious
charges, and they are legitimately the basis for a criminal indictment. There
100 1 discuss the lessons of the impeachment of President Clinton from other angles in
From Impeachment to Reform, 51 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
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is nothing trivial about these charges. But the alleged acts did not involve
perjury or obstruction of justice in connection with an alleged abuse of of-
fice. There is no allegation, for example, that President Clinton attempted
to obstruct justice with respect to an investigation of his misuse of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, or that he perjured himself in connection with un-
lawful trading of arms to a nation with whom the United States has an un-
friendly relationship. There is no question that perjury and obstruction of
justice could be legitimately impeachable offenses; but under the standard I
have outlined, these acts fall far short of the constitutional standard if they
involve an effort to conceal an illicit sexual relationship.
The closest claim, not passed by the House, involves the suggestion that
the President lied to his advisers and enlisted their help in covering up his
illicit relationship and his lies about it. Perhaps the relevant acts involved,
in some sense, the authority of the office of the President; it is reasonable to
think that in some sense they did. But this suggestion falls far short of a le-
gitimate basis for impeachment. We do not have, with this kind of misuse
of authority, the level of misuse that would justify an analogy to treason (as
understood at the time of the framing or since) or bribery.
2. Weak Responses
Let us explore several responses to this claim. One possible view, sug-
gested by many observers, is that no matter the crime, it is simply unaccept-
able for a criminal to stay in the White House. If the President in fact com-
mitted a crime, it might be said he is legitimately removed from office. It
should be clear that this view is not consistent with the Constitution as it is
written. The President is palpably not removable for the commission of any
crime. The question is whether he has committed a high crime or misde-
meanor.10 1 Criminality is not a sufficient ground for impeachment.
A related response would stress the possibility that the President has, by
committing perjury and engaging in other unlawful acts, violated the rule of
law, his oath of office, and his duty under the Take Care Clause of the Con-
stitution.102 This may well be true, but as grounds for impeachment it is a
weak argument. It cannot be claimed that any violation of the oath of of-
fice, or any law, or the Take Care Clause, is a legitimate basis for impeach-
ment, without rereading the Constitution in a quite fundamental way. Presi-
101 It is possible to understand "high" as referring to the office, not the crime, and this is
not an implausible view of the English practice. But in America, the concern was so con-
spicuously to require serious criminality, not any criminality, that this view could not, for us,
be seriously urged.
102 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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dent Truman, for example, was held to have violated the Take Care Clause
by seizing the steel mills, 10 3 and many of the cases described above in-
volved presidential violations of law. Law violations that amount to a vio-
lation of the oath of office, or the Take Care Clause, cannot count as im-
peachable offenses without something more than that.
3. Subtler Responses
In the present context, it would be possible to respond to my basic sug-
gestion-that President Clinton's alleged wrongdoing does not meet the
constitutional standard-in two more subtle ways. First, it might be urged
that actual or possible counts against President Clinton-the two Articles
for which he was impeached, and perhaps also frequent lies to the American
public-are very serious indeed, and in a sense uniquely serious. No other
president has been charged with lying under oath, and President Clinton is
joined only by President Nixon in having been charged with obstruction of
justice. It follows that if these very serious charges are deemed a legitimate
basis for impeachment, little or nothing will be done to alter the traditional
conception of impeachment. Perhaps some of these charges, involving in-
teractions with his advisers designed to promote lies or continued proce-
dural objections to the underlying inquiry, even amount to abuse of power.
In any case, the acts of lying within the criminal justice system and enlisting
others in the effort to do so are highly distinctive, different in kind from past
allegations against any other president (with the exception of President
Nixon). It might even be urged (as discussed below) that these acts are very
close indeed to bribery. If the President may be impeached for bribing a
judge or bribing a witness, may he not be impeached for lying under oath or
encouraging others to lie on his behalf? Second, and more ambitiously, it
might be said that whatever history and past practice show, we should un-
derstand the Constitution's text to allow the President to be impeached, via
the democratic channels, whenever a serious charge, of one sort or another,
is both made and proven. Let me take up these two responses in sequence.
If the first claim is that certain kinds of falsehoods under oath, perjury,
obstruction of justice, and so forth, could be a legitimate basis for impeach-
ment, there can be no objection. As I have suggested, a false statement un-
der oath about a practice of using the IRS to punish political opponents
would almost certainly be an impeachable offense; so, too, would a false
statement about the acceptance of a bribe to veto legislation. False state-
103 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S.
579, 587-89 (1952) (holding that the seizure of steel mills by the President could not be sus-
tained under the provisions of Article II of the Constitution, including the Take Care Clause).
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ments under oath might well be a legitimate basis for impeachment. Indeed,
lying to the American people may itself be an impeachable offense if, for
example, the President says that a treaty should be signed because it is in the
best interest of the United States when in fact he supports the treaty because
its signatories have agreed to donate money to his campaign. Nor can it be
denied that it is important to tell the truth under oath, no matter the subject
of the discussion. But it does not diminish the universal importance of tell-
ing the truth under oath to say that whether perjury or a false statement is an
impeachable offense depends on what it is about. The same is true for "ob-
struction of justice" or interactions with advisers designed to promote the
underlying falsehood.
Of course, anyone can be prosecuted for violating the criminal law, and
if the President has violated the criminal law, he is properly subject to
criminal prosecution after his term ends. 10 4 But it does not make much
sense to say, for example, that an American president could be impeached
for false statements under oath105 in connection with a traffic accident in
which he was involved, or that a false statement under oath, designed to
protect a friend in a negligence action, is a legitimate basis for impeach-
ment. Just as sensible prosecutors make decisions about which perjuries are
sufficiently serious to warrant prosecution, so a constitutional provision al-
lowing impeachment for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" should not be
taken to treat all perjuries as of a piece.
Probably the best general statement is that a false statement under oath
is an appropriate basis for impeachment if and only if the false statement
involves conduct that by itself raises serious questions about abuse of office.
A false statement about an illicit, consensual sexual relationship, obstruction
of justice, and a "conspiracy" to cover up that relationship, are not excus-
able or acceptable; the President can be made accountable for them via in-
dictment after he leaves office; but they are not high crimes or misdemean-
ors under the Constitution. The same is true for the other allegations made
about President Clinton thus far. It trivializes the criminal law to say that
some violations of the criminal law do not matter or do not matter much.
But it trivializes the Constitution to say that any false statement under oath,
regardless of its subject matter, provides a proper basis for impeachment.
104 It is an unsettled question whether a president may be indicted while in office. I be-
lieve that Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997), would not be understood to allow a presi-
dent to be subject to a criminal trial, which is far more likely to threaten the performance of
the President's constitutional duties than a civil proceeding. In any case, it is clear that an
effort to put the President in jail could not be consistent with Article II.
105 1 use this term as a placeholder for any allegations of conspiracy, obstruction ofjus-
tice, improper use of legal privileges, and so forth in connection with the illicit sexual rela-
tionship in question.
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4. Truth and Proportion
Of course, people of good faith could say that the President has a spe-
cial obligation to the truth, especially in a court of law, and that it is there-
fore reasonable to consider impeachment whenever the President has vio-
lated that obligation. It is certainly true that as the Nation's chief law
enforcement officer, the President has a special obligation to the truth. Per-
haps such people also believe that false statements under oath, perjury, ob-
struction of justice, and associated misconduct are genuinely unique and
that impeachment for such statements and misconduct would therefore fail
to do damage to our historical practice of resorting to impeachment only in
the most extreme cases. But this position has serious problems of its own.
Even if it would be possible, in principle, for reasonable people to confine
the current alleged basis for impeachment, it is extremely doubtful that the
line could be held in highly partisan practice. Thus, the House's judgment
that the current grounds are constitutionally appropriate has set an exceed-
ingly dangerous precedent for the future, a precedent that could threaten to
turn impeachment into a political weapon, in a way that would produce con-
siderable instability in the constitutional order.
Consider, for example, the fact that reasonable people can and do find
tax evasion far more serious than false statements about a consensual sexual
activity, and that reasonable people can and do find an unlawful arms deal
more serious, from a constitutional standpoint, than either. The question is
not whether those people are correct; they may or may not be. The problem
is deeper than that. Whenever serious charges are made, participants in
politics may well be pushed in particular directions by predictable partisan
pressures. The serious risk is therefore that contrary to the constitutional
plan, impeachment will become a partisan tool to be used by reference to
legitimate arguments by people who have a great deal to gain. As we will
soon see, a special risk of a ready resort to the impeachment instrument is
that it would interact, in destructive ways, with existing trends in American
democracy. From the standpoint of the constitutional structure, it is far
better to draw a line in the sand, one that has been characteristic of our con-
stitutional practice for all of our history: a practice of invoking impeach-
ment only for the most extreme cases of abuse of distinctly presidential
authority.
There is an important question about how those who approve (as I do
not) of the impeachment of President Clinton will, and should, regard the
general principle for which that impeachment stands. I suggest that in order
to remain as true as possible to our history, they should urge that President
Clinton committed serious felonies in direct connection with the judicial
system, and that it is appropriate to impeach the President for such serious
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and unique acts, even if presidential power was not involved. On this view,
the impeachment of President Clinton does not signal any departure from
our practices, nor does it mean that impeachment can be used more readily
than it has in the past.
10 6
B. Impeachment Now
But should the Nation adopt a lower standard for impeachment of the
President? Should we, for example, conclude that impeachment is legiti-
mate for criminality not involving misuse of office, or for misuse of office
that is perhaps not as "high" as has traditionally been thought? We might
consider, for example, the following propositions:
1. The President may be impeached for anyviolation of any law.
2. The President may be impeached for any crime.
3. The President may be impeached for any felony.
4. The President may be impeached for any violation of any law (civil
or criminal) involving the performance of his official responsibilities at any
time in public life.
5. The President may be impeached for any violation of any law (civil
or criminal) involving the performance of his official responsibilities while
in office.
6. The President may be impeached for any egregious abuse of his offi-
cial powers.
In the abstract, it is not clear whether a nation should subscribe to one,
two, or all of these propositions if it were creating a constitution from first
principles. Undoubtedly, a movement in the direction of propositions 1, 2,
or 3 would push a nation more toward a parliamentary system in which the
head of the executive branch can be removed from office upon a vote of"no
confidence." In the abstract, it is hardly obvious that an intermediate sys-
tem-a presidential system in which the President can be removed not for
mere lack of confidence, but because he has committed some identifiable
offense-would be inferior to the alternatives. Perhaps such an intermedi-
ate system would create more in the way of separation of powers than a
parliamentary system, but not the degree of dependence that a parliamentary
system creates. Perhaps the degree of separation produced by our hypo-
thetical intermediate system would be optimal. Surely it is possible to
imagine assumptions under which this would be true. Institutional ques-
tions of this kind do not have acontextual answers.
106 The legacy of the impeachment of President Clinton is discussed in more detail in
Cass R. Sunstein, Lessons from Impeachment to Reform, 51 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
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For the United States, it is doubtful that we could create such a system,
short of a constitutional amendment. But suppose that we could move in
that direction, via interpretation or amendment. Should we seek to do so? I
think that the clear answer is that we should not. The reason has a great
deal to do with the nature of both the contemporary presidency and modem
American democracy, where political disagreements are frequently turned
into allegations of scandalous behavior, asserting, all too often, an abuse of
public trust, a violation of law, or even criminality. This is not a claim that
the allegations are usually offered in bad faith or are always without merit,
or that what emerges in practice does not sometimes amount to an abuse, a
violation, or a crime. Political opponents can, on occasion, uncover some-
thing quite bad. My claim is instead that the focus on this kind of material
has a series of unfortunate effects for American self-government, and that
the possible benefits (discouraging and discovering bad conduct) do not
justify those unfortunate effects.
Let us briefly consider the Independent Counsel Act ("the Act") 10 7 and
then move to the topic of impeachment.10 8 The Act was a well-intentioned
effort to promote trust in government by ensuring that independent officials
would be entrusted with the authority to investigate allegations of improper
behavior by high-level people in the executive branch. In practice, how-
ever, the Act has created a variety of harmful incentives for Congress, the
media, and the independent counsel himself. Members of an opposing party
have every incentive to ask for the appointment of an independent counsel,
and to take any apparent wrongdoing extremely seriously, in such a way as
to divert attention from the actual task of making lives better for citizens.
Reporters who are concerned with audience share (which is to say almost all
reporters) are under considerable pressure to give great attention to the ap-
pointment of an independent counsel, or the work of the counsel, in such a
way as to crowd out news about more substantive matters. And armed with
an unlimited budget and a narrow focus, the Independent Counsel has a
natural incentive toward zealotry in a way that contrasts sharply with the or-
dinary criminal prosecutor, who would spend little or no time on many of
the cases that have been the focus of independent counsel investigations.
(None of this is a comment about the Independent Counsels themselves; all
of them have been honorable people). The result of all this has been a dis-
aster for the American public-a diversion from serious issues, a fear that
all politicians are crooks, and a deepened distrust of politicians.
107 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994).
103 For a more detailed discussion of the Act, see Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and
Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. W. 2267 (1998).
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Now consider impeachment in this light. Under current conditions,
what is likely to happen if the grounds for impeachment are expanded? The
serious risk is that impeachment will become a political weapon, one to be
used as a kind of substitute for the tasks of running the country and making
people's lives better. Of course, one way to attempt to be elected, or ree-
lected, is to say that a certain policy initiative is actually desirable and will
do a great deal of good. But another way to get elected, or reelected, is to
claim that members of the opposing party have actually committed crimes
and are in fact criminals to be eliminated from office. A risk of a ready re-
sort to the impeachment instrument is that it would interact, in destructive
ways, with existing trends in American democracy.
We may go further. In light of the incentives faced by the media and
the opposition party, and in the context of the Act, it was close to inevitable
that the impeachment instrument would eventually be invoked as a mecha-
nism to oust the President from office. With the unlimited budget and nar-
row focus of the Independent Counsel, some such Counsel would, sooner or
later, generate evidence that an American president has been involved in
some kind of crime. An impeachment proceeding would follow. None of
this eliminates President Clinton's own responsibility. The impeachment of
President Clinton reflected an odd constellation of events: the President's
own inexcusable misconduct; the incentives of the press and the opposing
party; the natural incentive effects of the Act for Independent Counsels
themselves; and the "referral" mechanism which essentially allows the in-
dependent counsel to initiate an impeachment inquiry.
There is one final point. The office of the President has assumed more
rather than less importance since the Founding, and in at least some re-
spects, its importance has continued to grow in every twenty-year period in
the twentieth century. This is true both domestically, where the President is
entrusted with ensuring execution of an extraordinary range of legislation,
and internationally, where the President is the only real spokesman for the
Nation. In these circumstances, the great risk of the impeachment mecha-
nism is that it is destabilizing in a way that threatens to punish the Nation as
much as, or perhaps far more than, the President himself. Since the purpose
of impeachment is not to punish officials but to protect the Nation,109 this is
a cruel irony.
None of these points amounts to a demonstration that it would be unde-
sirable to move in the direction of a "lower bar" for impeachment. The
109 See BERGER, supra note 19, at 1, 5-6, 297-98 (distinguishing impeachment from
criminal prosecutions and suggesting that the Framers "were steeped in history" in intending
for impeachment to be used as a means of preserving the effectiveness of the government
rather than as an instrument to punish officials for their conduct).
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question is what would be gained and what would be lost. If the basic pur-
pose of government is to make for better lives for citizens, it is highly likely
that nothing would be gained and a considerable amount would be lost. It
would be far better for the House of Representatives to conform to our his-
tory and to adopt a kind of "mutual arms control" agreement by which
members of opposing parties would agree not to use the impeachment
weapon, with its potentially destructive effect on national stability, except in
the most egregious cases.
C. Imaginable Cases
By way of summary and review, let us now explore a set of possible
cases for impeaching the President.
1. The President has accepted a bribe from a foreign country, receiving
substantial campaign contributions in return for a promise to help that
country, even though the help endangers the national security of the United
States. This is an easy case for impeachment. Even if it does not involve
treason, it does involve a "high" crime and is, therefore, an impeachable of-
fense.
2. The President uses the FBI and the CIA in order to obtain incrimi-
nating evidence about, and to punish, political adversaries. This conduct
may not involve a violation of the criminal law but it nonetheless involves
an impeachable offense-an egregious abuse of the power of the office.
3. During a war or a domestic crisis, the President fails to perform the
basic tasks of office, not because he has made choices with which many
people disagree, but because he has essentially defaulted. The default may
be a result of drunkenness, mental illness, physical problems, or sheer lazi-
ness. Here, too, there is no crime, but there is a misdemeanor sufficient to
remove the President from office.
4. The President cheats on his taxes. In ordinary circumstances, this is
not a legitimate basis for impeachment. There is no misuse of distinctly
governmental authority.
5. The President smokes marijuana in the White House. Here, too,
there is no basis for impeachment because there is no misuse of distinctly
governmental authority.
6. The President murders a political enemy. This is an easy case for
impeachment. It falls within the same category as case two above-an
egregious abuse of the President's power.
7. The President murders someone simply because he does not like
him. There is no political motivation; the dispute is entirely personal. This
is a hard case under the analysis thus far. There is no clear view from his-
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tory. On one view, there is no abuse of distinctly presidential powers, and
hence no impeachable offense. On another view, the best conclusion is that
the President can be impeached for this level of private misconduct on the
theory that this is undoubtedly an exceptionally serious crime, and the
President is not likely to be able to govern after committing such a crime.
Perhaps the Constitution would make little sense if it did not permit the Na-
tion to remove murderers from the highest office in the land. It would
probably be intolerable not to allow the President to be removable in such
an extreme case; the key point is that this judgment should not be allowed to
produce a different judgement about cases four and five above.'
10
D. A Note on Partisanship
From their discussion in Philadelphia, it is clear that the Framers feared
that impeachment could be used as a political tool, and sought to ensure a
standard that would insulate the President from impeachments that were
driven by factions, passions, or parochial interests. And while the Framers
did not anticipate the rise of political parties, it is reasonable to ask whether
and how the interest in "bipartisanship" should bear on the topic of im-
peachment. The impeachment of Andrew Johnson seems deplorable in
large part because of its partisan character."' And it is fair to say that the
founding debates show a general intention of allowing the impeachment de-
vices to be invoked only where there was a kind of national consensus, cut-
ting across partisan disagreements, to the effect that the President had
grossly abused his official powers. It makes sense to endorse the general
principle, on which history has also generally converged, to the effect that
the President (or for that matter judges) should not be subject to serious im-
peachment inquiry unless there is at least some consensus, across political
lines, that the inquiry is justified. It follows that future impeachments
should be avoided unless and until people who disagree on political ques-
tions can be brought to agree that the President has committed deeds that
justify his removal from office.
110 This conclusion does not contradict my suggestion that presidential abuse of power is
ordinarily required; I am speaking here of an extremely unusual case, an exception to the gen-
eral proposition.
See, e.g., JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 126 (1961) (describing the im-
peachment as "the sensational climax to the bitter struggle" between President Johnson and
the Radical Republicans); REHNQUIST, supra note 67, at 208-09, 214-18 (describing the role
of the Radical Republicans in passing the impeachment resolution in the House of Represen-
tatives).
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CONCLUSION
Text, history, and long-standing practice suggest that the notion of
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" should generally be understood to refer to
large-scale abuses that involve the authority that comes from occupying a
particular public office. A President who accepted a bribe from a foreign
nation, or who failed to attend to the public business during a war, would be
legitimately subject to impeachment. Perjury or false statements under oath
could certainly qualify as impeachable offenses if they involved, for exam-
ple, lies about using the Internal Revenue Service to punish one's political
opponents or about giving arms, unlawfully, to another nation. The most
ordinary predicate for impeachment is an act, by the President, that amounts
to a large-scale abuse of distinctly presidential authority.
If there is ever to be impeachment outside of that category of cases-if
the experience with President Clinton is to be repeated-it should be on ex-
ceedingly rare occasions. This principle is consistent with the basic view of
the Nation during the founding era. In the current period, the argument for
adhering to this view has been strengthened rather than weakened. It has
been strengthened partly because of a long historical tradition of forbear-
ance and restraint, one that has created a strong norm against the com-
mencement of impeachment proceedings, even when the President's mis-
conduct has been quite serious. And it has also been strengthened by
current trends in the modem political system, which has seen decreasing at-
tention to issues of substance and increasing attention to allegations of mis-
conduct, criminal or otherwise. In such circumstances, the impeachment
device stands not as a political tool, but as a remedy of last resort, designed
to make possible the removal from office of those presidents whose egre-
gious official misconduct has produced a social consensus that continuation
in office is no longer acceptable.
1998]
* * * * * *
